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ABSTRACT	
This is an article on policy instrument design wholly embodied in the state of the art endogenous 
regional development theory. The family of Collective Efficiency Strategies (CES) was originally con-
ceived in Portugal during the 2005/2009 legislative term and is very much replicable in other geogra-
phies and socio-economic environments, in emerging as well as in developed territories. They matter 
to deliver competitiveness and jobs by boosting business links among partnership members. Firms 
are indispensable to operate these networks but many other private, social and public agents whose 
action helps to internalise agglomeration and network externalities are also welcome. Four types of 
CES were launched, each aiming to address specific development bottlenecks: Growth and Competi-
tiveness Poles, Other Clusters, Urban Regeneration and Development Actions and Programmes for the 
Economic Enhancement of Endogenous Resources. Taken together, they provide policy action to 
stimulate trade-oriented knowledge provision, innovation in goods and services or processes, urban 
economic drivers and sustainable and durable networks of economic activity in low-density territo-
ries. Before presenting the CES, the paper provides the relevant theoretical background. A synthesis 
of current endogenous regional development models paves the way to introduce the key concept of 
collective efficiency. Some data on the application country helps to motivate the discussion. 
JEL classification codes: L52; L53; O25; R38; R58. 
Keywords: collective efficiency; endogenous development; regional development policy; Portugal; 
NSRF. 
1 Introduction	
Portugal has designed and launched in the period 2005 to 2009 an innovative family of four policy 
instruments based on the collective efficiency concept. They are labelled as “collective efficiency 
strategies”. This article aims at introducing the reader to these tools together with the relevant theo-
retical background. We believe the challenges that motivated their conception are common to many 
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other countries where no similar tools are available yet. Hence, the explanations herein may provide 
useful inspiration to develop related instruments elsewhere. 
The article reflects the author’s policy-making experience during that period. This enables to share 
with readers an insider’s perspective of the underlying motivation and politico-economic constraints 
that normally is not present in an economist’s text. In doing so, some biases are probably unavoida-
ble but we will do our best to keep them to a minimum. 
The political motivation to intervene in the regional development field stemmed from the awareness 
of acute structural challenges in the Portuguese economy. This awareness included the perception of 
what were some the most important underlying causes. Market and government failures were pre-
venting automatic adjustment mechanisms to work effectively to close the imbalances. As it will be-
come clear in the next section, those challenges commanded important behavioural changes on the 
part of all economic agents, including the government. A successful policy approach could not be 
limited strictly to the regional development “department”. Indeed, serious actions from line policies 
with significant territorial impact, such as education, justice and infrastructure, were requested and 
as much coordinated as possible. However, given the scope of this book, we will restrain the discus-
sion to strict regional development policy action. 
The preceding four decades witnessed an impressive correction of interregional asymmetries related 
to the population access to network services (electricity, sewerage, education, health care, mobility, 
telecommunications, etc.), to a large extent captured by comfort indicators. Competitiveness mark-
ers have evolved positively too, both in terms of interregional differences and in terms of national 
real convergence to the EU average. However, competitiveness progresses were weaker than com-
fort gains and there is clear evidence of a negative evolution in the last ten years. This empirical 
background is not strange to many other economies. A number of Portuguese competitive vulnera-
bilities were identified by policy-making at the diagnosis phase (2006) and we guess some of them, at 
least, show their influence in other countries as well: small scale of most firms facing international 
competition, cooperation deficit among economic agents, insufficient articulation between 
knowledge providers and knowledge users, lack of private ownership interventions in urban renewal 
operations, and a long-lasting vicious circle of impoverishing development in low population density 
territories. We thus believe in the transportability of the Collective Efficiency Strategies framework to 
other geographies. 
The design of these policy tools benefited a lot from economic theory, in particular from the endoge-
nous regional development literature. In order to fully appraise the policy rationale, the paper pro-
vides a synthesis of the relevant theoretical background. Using a large scale lens, we first recall the 
current research state to stress the importance of endogenous development drivers and their inter-
action with the so-called exogenous factors. Then, we zoom in the theoretical arena to magnify the 
most important economic concept to realise these policy tools, the collective efficiency notion owed 
to Schmitz (1999). The notion combines agglomeration economies with appropriately defined joint 
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actions. Based on this doctrinal refreshment, we will finally proceed to more practical matters and 
introduce the four members of the new regional development policy instrument family. 
There is one member directly headed to bridge the gap in the knowledge market with a strong global 
orientation: the Competitiveness and Technology Poles. The Others Clusters member aims at stimu-
lating more conventional clustering activities where physical proximity and territorial attachment are 
important. Urban Regeneration and Development Actions intend to stimulate private-public partner-
ships to renew cities and explore inter-city synergies so as to improve their competitiveness pro-
spects. Programmes for the Economic Enhancement of Endogenous Resources are the fourth type of 
Collective Efficiency Strategy; they aim at redressing the vicious development circle faced by many 
low density territories. 
These policy instruments work through the endogenous factors of development. The idea is to stimu-
late local and regional communities to make use of different forms of capital endowments (human, 
social, creative, etc.) to provide goods and services valued by consumers in other regions and coun-
tries. Making them to realise there are moments to compete and moments to cooperate is instru-
mental to deliver collective efficiency on the ground and boost territorial competitiveness. In times 
of hard public budget constraints, it is good to know that Collective Efficiency Strategies are an ex-
tremely affordable policy instrument. Soft encouragement measures such as technical coaching, li-
censing procedures speed-up and political affection can be more effective than fiscal stimulus to 
make the difference. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sketches the structural weaknesses that motivate policy 
action. The neoclassical economic growth model of the 1950’s is recalled in Section 3, where we also 
introduce the sustainable regional development definition and resort to a graphical apparatus to 
offer a synthesis of the state of the art endogenous drivers explanations. Within this playing field, 
Section 4 presents the collective efficiency concept and combines neoclassical and industrial district 
literature arguments to illuminate feasible policy actions to overcome the kind of competitive vul-
nerabilities that are conditioning development prospects in Portugal and elsewhere. Section 5 makes 
the transition from economic theory to policy-setting; it warns about excessive confidence on public 
action and makes clear the link between collective efficiency and competitive vulnerabilities. The 
tools family is introduced in Section 6, initially through a synoptic view and subsequently via the mis-
sion of each member. A barebone presentation of operational features follows in Section 7. Section 8 
shows how these tools are already aligned with EU political guidelines for the 2014–2020 cohesion 
policy cycle, thus presenting themselves as possible vehicles for actual implementation. Finally, Sec-
tion 9 concludes. 
2 The	motivating	problem	
The will to act and design the policy tools we intend to show in this article emerged when the region-
al development branch of the Portuguese government was given the responsibility to draft the strat-
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the international trade environment. Portugal co-founded the European Free Trade Association (EF-
TA) in 1960 and was the only developing country selling labour-intensive goods at zero rate tariffs to 
wealthy partners while enjoying the comfort of EFTA protectionism vis-à-vis external competition. 
This model led Portugal to specialise successfully in low-skill industrial products for many years, until 
the globalisation triumph at the end of the nineties. 
Explanations for the role each reason above played during all this period fall outside the scope of this 
paper; it suffices to say they have braked considerably the adjustment pace of the productive special-
isation profile to the changing conditions in global competition. Fortunately, economic agents, in-
cluding public authorities, are more aware of these development bottlenecks in recent years and 
some important sectoral policy measures are underway, from education improvements to red tape 
cuts. Yet, much more needs to be done on those obstacles with a determined view to the future—
notably, more serious price regulation in oligopolistic markets and structural reforms on justice and 
health care system. Although the competitiveness problem needs to be tackled with several other 
policies and hopefully in a coordinated manner, it was certainly a major concern for action on the 
part of regional development policy. 
The picture depicted in the above paragraphs is not exclusive of Portugal. Indeed, developed regions 
and countries face also increasing difficulties to grow. Table 1 is quite clear. USA, Canada, Japan, and 
the highly developed Member States impress by their modest growth rates in recent years. The fi-
nancial turmoil around the sovereign debt crisis in the USA and EU at the time this text is being writ-
ten (Summer 2011) has a lot to do with their competitive weaknesses in global markets of goods and 
services. So our subject matter may have an international interest. 
Table 1—Real GDP per capita growth rates, 2000–2007 
Annual average change (%) 
Brazil 3.1
Russia 7.7
India 5.2
China 9.9
Mexico 0.6
USA 1.4
Canada 1.4
Japan 1.5
EU-27 1.8
Highly-developed Member States 1.4
Moderately developed Member States 2.9
Less developed Member States 5.2
Source: European Commission (2010c, p. 1). 
If real convergence of the national economy with respect to the EU benchmark became a problem in 
recent years, it is not a smaller concern within the country. The left panel of Chart 2 depicts the posi-
tion of each NUTS level 3 region in mainland Portugal in terms of real GDP per head. All territories 
improved significantly their absolute positions since 1970, as shown by the outward displacement of 
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the curve. Yet, as time went by, irregularities in the curvature have not decreased and remain sub-
stantial as a consequence of strong interregional asymmetries. In 2001, Grande Lisboa (the highest 
per capita GDP region) was 3.6 times as larger than Tâmega (the lowest region, close to the northern 
border with Spain). The right panel unveils a very different story. The underlying figures come from a 
composite index (comfort index) that captures households’ access to network services such as elec-
tricity, sewerage, and health care. There has been a strong overall progress since the 60’s with an 
unambiguous correction of interregional imbalances. 
Chart 2—Interregional imbalances (Portuguese NUTS level 3 regions, 1970–2001) 
 
Source: Adapted from Cónim (1999) and Carvalho and Matias (2004). 
Back to the international stage, we note that, despite the general progress in a long run perspective, 
there are slowing down signs in recent years on the geographic growth pattern within the EU. Euro-
pean Commission (2010c) reports “Convergence between regions in the EU-15 Member States was 
strong up to the mid 1990s, but the process since then has slowed down. From 1980 to 1996, there 
was clear narrowing of disparities, the coefficient of variation falling from 33 to 29. Since 1996, it has 
remained between 29 and 30.” So the motivation that inspired Collective Efficiency Strategies in Por-
tugal is somehow present in many other countries as well. 
2.2 Cooperation	deficit	
On top of the deep bottlenecks identified in Subsection 2.1, the economy presented an additional 
structural deficit: the cooperation deficit. For historical and sociological reasons, Portuguese individ-
uals are quite generous in terms of personal relations but, when it comes to professional delibera-
tions and economic decisions, then individualism plays a prominent role. This is so among private 
firms, among ministries, among neighbouring municipalities, and, by a continuity argument, among 
firms, universities, training agencies, central and local administration.2 
                                                            
2 Adam Smith was probably having the Portuguese people in mind when he wrote in 1776 that “people of the 
same trade seldom meet together”... Smith (1904, Book I, Ch. 10, par. 82). 
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We were conscious about this competitive disadvantage. As a small economy in a globalised world, 
Portuguese institutions will always be small when compared to their counterparts in Germany, UK, 
Italy, nor to mention USA or China. Yet, small does not necessarily mean inefficient, even in products 
or services where scale matters. The secret lies on the smart use of all available resources for devel-
opment. Endogenous regional development theory, as we will stress in the next section, have 
brought agglomeration economies and social capital to the attention of policy-makers as competi-
tiveness drivers. If people trust each other and, in particular, entrepreneurs in a particular industry 
realise there are moments to compete and moments to cooperate among themselves, then the indi-
vidual firm scale melts down as a barrier to market success. The willingness to cooperate is clearly a 
place-based intangible resource whose endowment at a given point in time results from a long, com-
plex interplay of socio-economic factors. Some territories are well endowed, others are scarcely pro-
vided. Could policy help to inflow cooperation to a poorly endowed economic fabric? What kind of 
instruments would be cost-effective? These issues kept puzzling in our heads for some time. We be-
lieve that lack of cooperation is also present in the economic culture of many other countries. 
3 The	background	from	endogenous	regional	development	theory	
This section is a summary account of Baleiras (2011b, pp. 22–50). It sets the intellectual stage from 
which the policy tools emerged. 
3.1 The	early	neoclassical	standpoint	
Seminal contributions by eminent economists, such as Harrod (1939), Domar (1946) and Solow 
(1956), have established an influential view about the determinants of economic growth, which be-
came known as the neoclassical economic development explanation. Under constant returns to 
scale, the aggregate real output per labour unit (y) in a particular territory is an increasing function of 
capital-to-labour ratio (k) and time (t), 
 ( ) ( )y A t f k= . (1) 
Differentiating and applying growth rates, we derive the dynamic version of the neoclassical produc-
tion function, 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆˆ f ky A t K Lf′= + − , (2) 
where 0f ′ >  is the marginal productivity of capital intensity, K and L are the capital and labour re-
source endowments, respectively, and the “^” symbol denotes relative change between two consec-
utive moments. Aˆ  stands for the rate of technological progress. A few comments about the neoclas-
sical formulation are worth noting. Firstly, economic development is downsized to potential GDP per 
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labour unit,3 an analytical simplification especially convenient for quantitative research but highly 
misleading with respect to what stands behind sustainable life quality, which is a more comprehen-
sive notion of economic development.4 Secondly, there are four potential regional output per resi-
dent growth drivers only: 
• Indigenous capital intensity endowment growth; 
• Interregional production factor mobility; 
• Intersectoral production factor mobility; 
• Technological progress growth. 
Thirdly, for many years, technological progress remained a black box serving to capture, in an exoge-
nous manner, most economic growth explanations lying beyond the scope of individual decision-
making. Finally, there is no role for territory-specific resource endowments, besides transport costs 
and interregional input mobility. 
3.2 Conceptual	evolution	towards	sustainable	regional	development	
Interest on growth theory has reborn in the mid-eighties. Opening the neoclassical black box was a 
too tempting challenge to remain answerless for longer. Some research lines looked for enlighten-
ment on technology itself, others dug on the role of interactions among economic agents. More re-
cent rationales felt necessary to enlarge the study object to other dimensions of regional economic 
development because potential output growth itself, in these perspectives, is bounded by factors 
such as institutional density, entrepreneurship and social capital. In all these avenues, endogenisa-
tion of the “A factor” is the goal, i.e., they are all striving to explain technological progress and its 
contribution to growth through the role of other variables. In doing so, more or less complex trans-
mission mechanisms have been devised. 
In the sequel, we offer a synthesis of what we believe to be the state of the art in terms of economic 
development driving forces understanding. Some forces are generated outside the territory, and can, 
therefore, be labelled as exogenous causes, while others are formed within the territory, thus having 
an endogenous nature.5 It is perhaps better to begin with the very notion of development whose 
evolution now encompasses the multidimensional concept of life quality. Everyone’s perception of 
                                                            
3 Output per head and output per labour unit move very closely in the short run. Under appropriate care, we 
can use one interpretation or the other. 
4 The Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas summarises the conformism of mainstream economists with the neo-
classical vision of economic development: “By the problem of economic development I mean simply the prob-
lem of accounting for the observed pattern, across countries and across time, in levels and rates of growth of 
per capita income. This may seem too narrow a definition, and perhaps it is, but thinking about income pat-
terns will necessarily involve us in thinking about many other aspects of societies too. So I would suggest that 
we withhold judgment on the scope of this definition until we have a clearer idea of where it leads us”—Lucas 
(1988, p. 3). 
5 The “endogenous” adjective is used with a double sense in the literature. Sometimes, it refers to drivers with-
in the territory; others it applies to causes external to the neoclassical formulation of labour and capital inputs 
in equation (1). 
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life quality depends on attributes such as individual levels of disposable income, education achieve-
ments, health condition or noise pollution but also on how these variables impact on the neighbour-
ing community. These attributes are intrinsically place-based and the values that matter for an indi-
vidual’s life quality are those observed where she lives or works most of the time. So economic de-
velopment is necessarily a territorial concept and is deeply linked to the sustainability of three ele-
ments: consumption patterns, environment use and social cohesion. The former sustainability stems 
directly from the budget constraint. If a household spends more than it earns for a number of years, 
inevitably one day it will have to cut down the consumption pattern so as to pay debt back and this 
adjustment will certainly hurt its life quality perception. The same fate applies to collective consump-
tion. The unfeasibility of a particular consumption pattern comes to surface faster during hard credit 
market times. This leads us to the second sustainability concept. All societies appraise, albeit differ-
ently among themselves or across time, the preservation of a certain intergenerational equity in the 
fruition of natural resources, which imposes a sustainability constraint on Nature’s use. Finally, no 
feasible process of life quality improvement should induce systematic social exclusion above what 
may be regarded as the tolerable ceiling. History is full of social disruption examples, often with vio-
lent consequences, triggered by serious income distribution aggravation within a given community, 
notably with respect to individual enhancement opportunities. This is why it makes sense to realise 
life quality as sustainable regional development (SRD).6 
3.3 A	state	of	the	art	synthesis	
Our starting point to explain the causes of SRD is Stimson et al. (2011, pp. 10–11), where one catego-
ry of neoclassical inputs and four categories of endogenous development inputs are lined up to ex-
plain the target variable, SRD. The categories correspond to the regional endowment of particular 
forms of capital resource, as follows: 
1. Productive Capital (PC) endowment—clusters the explanatory capacity of the neoclassical 
production function without the A residual. It amounts to the efficient contribution of physi-
cal labour and capital endowments for potential output; 
2. Human Capital (HC) endowment—corresponds to the labour input quality available in the 
territory under scrutiny. This quality is higher the better are formal education, professional 
training, workplace learning, and horizontal skills, such as information technology familiarity 
and social responsibility. It can be realised as a device that improves the productivity of a 
given physical labour input endowment and modelled as a multiplying scaling factor. A bal-
anced human capital distribution across individuals is better than an asymmetric one be-
cause social interactions matter in the transmission of HC impulses to SRD; 
3. Social Capital (SC) endowment—comprises the intensity of communication and interaction 
among resident people, their social-economic ties, formal and informal solidarity systems, 
                                                            
6 This triple sustainability definition of economic development and its territorial attachment are by no means 
original. See, for example, Stimson and Stough (2009, Ch. 2). 
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trust-based relationships, willingness to cooperate with others, formal and informal econom-
ic agent cooperation networks, etc.; 
4. Creative Capital (CrC) endowment—captures the territory’s response capacity to challenges 
and opportunities and is built up on proactivity, entrepreneurial capacity, mind plasticity to 
find new ways of thinking or to adopt new playing methods, innovative knowledge, ability to 
define new artistic trends or to anticipate future consumption patterns, etc.. Urban multicul-
turalism favours the diffusion of this input; 
5. Ecological Capital (EC) endowment—stems from the availability of local environmental 
amenities that make more pleasant to live or work in that place: green spaces, fresh air, 
plenty water, nice landscapes, etc.. 
In our view, there are two missing categories of endogenous resources in the above list: cultural capi-
tal and institutional capital. So, we enlarge the list in this fashion: 
6. Cultural Capital (CC) endowment—as with ecological capital, the presence of material and 
immaterial cultural assets is a source of residents and visitors attraction as well as of creative 
energy. We are referring to historical built heritage (civilian, military, religious) but also to 
works of art (books, sculpture, painting), performing arts and traditional knowledge. Some 
cultural elements are so unique, barely replicable elsewhere in the long run and suitable to 
leverage business and job chains that they are at the base of the Collective Efficiency Strate-
gy variety for low population density territories (the PROVERE initiative, to be introduced in 
Subsection 6.5); 
7. Institutional Capital (IC) endowment—Amounts to the density and quality of private, public 
and social organisations in the territory. The complexity of professional tasks requires appro-
priate framing institutions inasmuch as institutionalism is more effective than individualism 
to provide services for others. Naturally, governance models and installed technical capaci-
ties matter to set the level of available IC in a particular place. 
Under the shape of a heptagon, Figure 1 provides an interesting picture of the influence that factors 
endogenous to the territory have on its sustainable development. The continuous lines joining the 
factors represent interactions among them; dotted arrows depict the effect each factor has on SRD. 
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Figure 1—Endogenous inputs contributions to sustainable regional development 
 
Interaction between the different capital types (heptagon vertices) may trigger comparative ad-
vantages, backward and forward interindustrial links, transport costs, and scale, agglomeration and 
network externalities. All these interactive effects impact upon the target (SRD) with more or less 
intensity according to the case in hands. From an institutional viewpoint, endogenous regional de-
velopment processes have a matrix nature. Effective combinations of different capital types require 
sound cooperation solutions, at both the horizontal and vertical levels. The former involve coopera-
tion within each category of economic players (firms, municipalities, ministries) and the latter be-
tween agents of different categories. 
The SRD explanation is not complete without accounting for the influence of factors exogenous to 
the territory. Indeed, many life quality indicators in a given place reflect conditions from variables 
determined elsewhere upon which resident players have little control, if any. Examples include la-
bour market legislation, knowledge and innovation diffusion mechanisms, macroeconomic policies 
stance, effectiveness of large social systems such as justice, education and health care, road network, 
volume and quality of direct investment projects undertaken by non-resident agents and the interre-
gional and intersectoral mobility degrees of neoclassical production factors (labour and capital). 
There are, of course, interactions between these external impulses (e.g., the effect of the fiscal policy 
orientation on health system performance), which leads us to join them by continuous arcs in Figure 
2. 
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SRD
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Figure 2—Exogenous inputs 
 
These interactions may develop favourable or unfavourable features in the demand for exports as 
well as in scale, agglomeration and network externalities outside the concerned territory with a larg-
er or smaller impact on SRD, according to the arguments that usually explain these drivers—see 
Baleiras (2011, pp. 34–45) for details. 
Finally, we put together in Figure 3 the two SRD explanatory blocks. The exogenous factors block 
impacts upon SRD via two channels: directly on the territory’s life quality indicators, which is dis-
played by the dashed arrows, and indirectly through effects mediated by endogenous factors, repre-
sented by the continuous arrows. This figure is a possible illustration of today’s state of the art in 
economic development theory. Its lessons apply to metropolitan as well as to rural areas, they con-
cern developed as well as developing countries. 
Figure 3—A sustainable regional development model 
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Costa selects a land plot in the Ave Valley (North of Portugal), close to other firms in the textile indus-
try, some as small as hers, others larger. There are already other shirt makers in the vicinity. This 
means she has figured out the risks of competition for suppliers and customers; being closer to com-
petitors, her profit margin per output unit may be smaller than in an isolated location. Yet, this prox-
imity with direct competitors as well as with firms specialised in other stages of the textile value 
chain, offers Costa some advantages. Firstly, there are hundreds of specialised textile workers in the 
Ave Valley and so the training costs here are considerably lower than in an isolated location. Second-
ly, tens of other end-product makers share the same few specialised producers of intermediate in-
puts, such as button makers, located in the Ave Valley as well. The proximity to suppliers facilitates 
face-to-face contacts, an important feature at least in the early stages of product development. As 
long as increasing returns to scale exist in the production of these inputs, supply sharing is an effi-
cient device for a small buyer as Costa to reach the cost benefit of scale economies which normally 
are only available to large shirt producers. Thirdly, Costa is aware of the value of information for her 
business, particularly the information regarding technological developments. In an industrial district, 
information circulates easily, there are even many informal channels (coffee shops, coiffeur saloons 
and other places where workers and entrepreneurs socialise) that prove effective to know what is 
around. Appraised together, these advantages reduce the risk of business failure and facilitate the 
access to a larger pool of suppliers and customers when compared to isolated locations. 
4.2 Agglomeration	economies	
In the illustration above, we have laid down the three classic positive externalities associated with 
firm agglomeration (also known as agglomeration economies): labour market pooling, scale econo-
mies in the production of intermediate inputs and information economies. You can read more about 
them in an urban economics textbook.7 Actually, their acknowledgment in the economics literature 
goes back to Alfred Marshall, one of the parents of neoclassical economics. In his much acclaimed 
1890 The Principles of Economics textbook, Marshal coins the concept of external economies to ex-
press the benefits an individual firm reaps from “the general development of the industry”.8 We can 
express this idea formally. Let Costa be firm i in industry j (textile). Suppose there are H textile firms 
in the Ave Valley. Costa’s production cost, ijc , is a function of her own output, ijy , and the aggregate 
                                                            
7 O’Sullivan (2009, Chs 3 and 4) is an excellent source to deepen this matter. 
8 Quotation from the eighth edition, Marshall (1920): Book IV, Ch. IX, par. 25. Interestingly, he introduced the 
notion of external economies to explain why firms of a particular industry may be interested to cluster. Atten-
tion to clusters or industrial districts, to use Marshall’s own expression, was also an innovative idea at that 
time. Though intellectually appealing, both the external economies concept and even more the industrial dis-
tricts idea remained rarely used by mainstream economists for decades. Porter (1990) and subsequent works 
rediscovered the industrial district idea, refined it to allow for the simultaneous presence of closely related 
activity sectors and popularised it under the term “cluster”. In what follows, we will use the expressions “clus-
ter” and “industrial district” indistinctly because their difference is inconsequential for our purposes. Krugman 
(1995) played a significant role to revive the external economy argument and provides a justification for its 
long general dismissal in the economics profession. Clusters and external economies (agglomeration econo-
mies) are now widely employed in economic models and discussions. 
15 
 
output produced by all other firms in industry j, hjh y∑  for 1,h H= K  and h i≠ . In other words, Cos-
ta’s cost function is 
 
1
,
H
ij ij hj
h
h i
c c y y
=≠
  =    
∑    , (3) 
where we have omitted input prices for simplicity. The marginal cost of own output is positive, as 
usual, but the marginal cost with respect to the others’ output is negative, 0ij hjh ic yδ δ ≠ <∑ . This 
latter derivative reflects the presence of agglomeration economies, i.e., the benefits to Costa’s firm 
from locating in the Ave Valley industrial district.9 By a symmetry argument, note that the other firms 
in the cluster also benefit with Costa’s arrival in the territory. The larger the number of newcomers, 
the larger the cluster, and so, for each incumbent firm, the larger are the benefits from labour mar-
ket pooling, scale economies in intermediate goods production and information diffusion. Hence, the 
smaller becomes each incumbent firm’s cost for any individual output level. 
4.3 Joint	actions	
Please note that these external effects arise from location sharing without explicit interaction be-
tween players. Costa neither asked permission to settle in nor did she entered into any agreement to 
benefit from cluster spillovers or to grant external benefits to any particular incumbent. Agglomera-
tion economies are a persuasive factor to explain firm clustering, yet they are not sufficient to ex-
plain why some clusters grow and eventually go international while others stagnate or even shrink 
after a while. There is abundant empirical evidence on successful and faded industrial districts—see, 
for instance, Chs 25 to 49 in Becattini et al. (2009) and the references therein. Schmitz (1999) dis-
cusses this issue extensively and offers an insightful rationale. He claims that joint actions undertaken 
by members of the district, on top of agglomeration economies, are what makes the difference in 
terms of competitiveness success. These are deliberate actions consciously and explicitly agreed 
among cluster members to achieve efficiency gains for them. They can be an agreement between 
four small shirt makers to divide a single large order, a research centre set up by a pool of shirt and 
fabric makers to develop new textile products or the co-ordinated presence of the industrial district 
in an international business exhibition. Table 2 summarises the forms joint actions may take. The 
keyword here is cooperation. Joint actions are the outcome of cooperation between cluster mem-
bers. Co-operation may involve competitors only (horizontal cooperation) or the junction of deliber-
ate and coordinated actions by input producers and users or output producers and buyers (vertical 
cooperation). You should bear in mind that cooperation does not preclude competition between 
                                                            
9 Readers familiar with urban economics will recognise these agglomeration economies as the localisation 
ones. If the cluster combines firms from other industries, it is appropriate to account also for a second variety 
of agglomeration externalities: the so-called urbanisation economies. They are captured by the negative partial 
derivative of the cost function with respect to total complementary output, or 0ij hjh i jc yδ δ ≠ <∑ ∑ . 
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members. Based on facts accounted for in the empirical literature, we may conclude that competi-
tive clusters are those that succeed to combine cooperation with rivalry. 
Table 2—Forms of joint actions in clusters 
 
Source: Schmitz (1999). 
4.4 Collective	efficiency	and	competitive	advantage	
External economies (of agglomeration) are a necessary and sufficient condition to clustering but are 
not enough to justify the subsequent achievement of clustered firms, notably their growth and win-
ning path in globalised export markets. This is so because external economies are involuntary. The 
positive impact on one firm’s profit from the localisation decision of another “is not a deliberate ac-
tion but an unintended or incidental by-product of some otherwise legitimate activity”—Schmitz 
(1999). Joint actions, by contrast, are the outcome of consciously coordinated behaviours to attain 
collective benefits. These actions pursue some form of public good provision to the club (cluster) 
members—e.g. common branding, machine hours sharing, trained workers, business mission to for-
eign markets...10 Empirical evidence from many cases in both developed and developing countries 
supports the conviction that the chances for growth and competitiveness of enterprise clusters are 
brighter the more deliberate and pro-active joint actions are pursued. Therefore, following Schmitz, 
we define collective efficiency “as the competitive advantage derived from agglomeration economies 
and joint actions”. 
This statement echoes back in the economist’s toolkit to remember the three sources of territorial 
competitiveness advantage (or efficiency) trade theory tells us: first, productivity differences at the 
firm level under linear technologies (ricardian theory); second, relative factor abundance differences 
under constant returns to scale (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory); third, increasing returns to 
scale (also known as scale economies internal to the firm) under product differentiation (Krugman 
theory). Collective efficiency can thus be presented as a fourth source of comparative advantage for 
clustered firms (or industrial districts/territories): joint actions under external economies in an indus-
trial district. In all four cases, there is a distinctive feature triggering a lower output price and, there-
fore, a competitive advantage. 
4.5 Generalisations	of	the	collective	efficiency	concept	
We now give a step further to enter more explicitly the regional development arena. Schmitz has 
developed his concept of collective efficiency considering one category only of economic agents: 
firms. However, other types of players behave in real-world clusters and coordinated actions across 
agent types can activate benefits for all as well. For example, local governments can be useful part-
                                                            
10 These goods feature non-rivalry in consumption (that is why they can be labelled public) although access may 
be restrained and self-opting out may apply. 
Bilateral Multilateral
Horizontal e.g. Sharing equipment e.g. Sectoral Association
Vertical e.g. Producer and user improving components e.g. Alliance across value added chain
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ners to help firms to grow and compete if public money follows private action. This can be the case 
of a partnership between the enterprises association and a municipality to build and run an exhibi-
tions facility. The municipality may pay for the land use and the firms for the building and operation 
costs. This facility may help to diffuse internationally the competences of the territory, to incubate 
new firms and to house a technological development centre. Another interesting kind of players is a 
research centre or a higher education unit. Appropriate, tailor made contracts with some or all clus-
tered firms can be an effective way to transfer knowledge into mercantile goods and leverage a sus-
tained inflow of innovation to clustered firms. We think it is appropriate to speak of collective effi-
ciency as well when multi-institutional cooperation is in place. 
A second generalisation of this concept comes to mind when we think of the increasing number of 
transactions carried out before computer screens. For many activities, information and communica-
tion technologies provide efficient proxies for face-to-face contacts. Going back to our earlier textile 
example, frequent electronic interactions, combined with just a few face contacts from time to time, 
are a cheap and yet higher quality device to discuss ideas and experiment new product solutions 
between shirt, button and fabric makers. Orders can be placed by e-mail, training can be offered 
remotely, labour search can be performed through databases. This means that basically the same 
kind of benefits allowed by agglomeration can be offered by effective network cooperation. Network 
cooperation does not need physical proximity of players but requires explicit, deliberate joint actions 
among partners. Contrary to agglomerations, in this case external effects (which we may label as 
network externalities) do not exist without joint actions, they result from the latter. Appropriate 
competitiveness-oriented joint actions can indeed generate a price advantage for networkers, thus 
qualifying them as another form of collective efficiency. 
To conclude this theoretical section, we come back to Figure 4. Occurrence of joint actions requires 
social interaction. The effectiveness of joint actions as a business efficiency device depends a lot on 
the quality of the social environment., i.e., on the seven endogenous capital endowments and their 
interactions. Trust, sharing traditions, entrepreneurship spirit, firm density, strength of community 
institutions are important ingredients to manufacture effective collective efficiency. These elements 
are not uniformly distributed and clusters are very unlike in terms of their composition. Although the 
Ave Valley is an industrial district example, cooperation among residents—including firms, municipal-
ities, universities, public and private professional training centres, etc.—is not as strong as in other 
cases, which may explain the difficulties the textile industry has undergone there over the last 15 
years and the relative success in other European districts where social capital has been better 
equipped for joint actions for a longer time.11 
                                                            
11 See Baleiras (2011a) for a metaphoric yet realistic comparison between the Ave Valley and Treviso (north of 
Italy) textile districts. Forty years ago both territories comprised very similar firm structures (family-run small 
clustered businesses). Individualistic tradition in the former case and strong cooperation links in the latter ac-
count significantly for the different collective performances until nowadays. Cooperation in the Portuguese 
case has improved substantially in recent years but History still makes the difference. 
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5 From	economics	to	policy-making	
Before switching from the theoretical survey to actual policy drafting, a few caveats apply about the 
limitations of public action and the empirical ground our instruments are expected to step in. 
5.1 Caveats	
A word of caution comes to mind before advocating government intervention in the economy. As 
with other forms of externalities, economies of agglomeration are likely to lead to market failure, i.e., 
to resource allocations that do not maximise social welfare. Economic agents who cause the benefit 
to others and are not compensated for it may soon reduce their effort to a (social) suboptimal level. 
This raises the temptation, so often in political speeches about the economy, of calling for govern-
ment intervention. However, care is required before making such call. Firstly, note that joint actions 
may be an excellent device civil society has to internalise those external effects and put the economy 
in a Pareto-track towards efficiency. Examples such as an exhibition of cluster competences, a part-
nership with a university to run a technological centre, a booking central covering tens of nature 
tourism lodging units can effectively promote positive sum games without public intervention. Sec-
ondly, when we realise the development potential of a cluster or network, we immediately conclude 
that the most useful pubic action is not necessarily subsidisation or any form of tax relief. The role of 
collective efficiency as an effective development leverage is stronger the more cohesive and self-
governed the partnership of agents is. In many cases, particularly when the initial conditions are 
weak, the wisest public action is the stimulation of social capital, i.e., helping economic agents to 
know each other, identify common objectives, draw a feasible strategy to extract value from their 
resources and organise themselves with a good governance model. These warnings were considered 
seriously when drafting the Collective Efficiency Strategy instruments. 
The cooperation resource, or collective efficiency if you now prefer a more scientific terminology, is 
precisely among the most precious ones available to small agents committed to win in the global 
economy. Through judiciously undertaken joint actions, the efficiency outcomes typical of larger and 
more mature agents become also reachable to them. In fact, many activities parallel to physical pro-
duction are nowadays very important sources of competitive advantage, such as branding, R&D and 
market intelligence. These activities frame the core business and command deep pockets because of 
the substantial fixed costs that are typically involved. Very often, these costs are a barrier to entry of 
SMEs in the global market, particularly those based in small economies. Smart use of collective effi-
ciency can help small-sized agents a lot to share those fixed costs and overcome the market barriers 
associated to their individual size. This idea lied at the heart of the policy tools whose design is dis-
cussed below. 
5.2 Competitive	vulnerabilities	and	collective	efficiency	
So, collective efficiency can help a lot to make the difference in the delivery of welfare gains from 
trade. The Portuguese government identified four domains of competitive vulnerability where effec-
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tive collective action is expected to make a significant contribution: knowledge market, productive 
internationalisation, urban regeneration and low density territories. The following paragraphs will 
elaborate a little on each of these vulnerability domains. Collective Efficiency Strategies were devised 
to help mitigating such weaknesses which, we think, are also found in other geographies. This is an-
other reason why the toolkit is transportable to other competitive vulnerabilities via judicious cus-
tomisation. 
Firstly, the link between knowledge production and knowledge trading use is a prosperity source 
clearly underexplored in Portugal. For a long time, universities or research centres, on the one hand, 
and the business community, on the other, have ignored each other’s common interest to cooperate 
in joint Research and Technology Development (R&TD) projects. Traditional public support to re-
search, anchored on subsidies to individuals (such as doctoral scholarships) or single institutions 
(public laboratories and firms), seemed to ignore this deficiency. New national priorities for structur-
al funds in the 2007/2015 implementation period led to the creation of specific instruments to help 
creating this market, putting together for the first time individual research centres and small firms: 
the innovation cheque and the R&TD cheque. Yet, much more could be done to fully utilise the sub-
stantial increase in the number of fulltime researchers over the last 20 years and the accumulated 
experience of individual firms in business areas where key resources are relatively abundant in Por-
tugal (renewable energies, maritime activities, health, wine, furniture and information & communica-
tion technologies, to mention a few well-known examples of business success). Bringing together 
players in various sectors to innovate, export and qualify jobs was, therefore, a challenge for collec-
tive efficiency. 
Secondly, as evidenced in Section 2 above, the last decade brought very modest GDP growth as a 
result of competitive losses from structural handicaps. Many observers have blamed the business 
community for delaying too much the necessary adjustments to a changing trade environment and 
the authorities for complacency with that behaviour, if not for their active promotion of sluggish 
transformation. From a long term economic perspective, it is sad to acknowledge that resources have 
moved too much away from tradable activities into domestic uses defended from international com-
petition. The funding difficulties the Portuguese economy is going through during the euro zone fi-
nancial turmoil of 2010 and 2011 are a clear indication of the excessive private and public indebted-
ness. The competitiveness weaknesses we have pointed out throughout this article obviously aggra-
vate the economic rebalancing. Therefore, a resolute bet on the internationalisation of resident eco-
nomic activities is a must. This means more competition at home and abroad for domestic firms, 
market enlargement for inland activities (visitation) and exports, joint ventures abroad. Collective 
efficiency can also play a decisive role to help Portuguese agents to win the internationalisation chal-
lenge. 
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Thirdly, urban economists have long stressed the economic importance of urban areas. In developed 
countries, between 65 and 80% of total population lives in urban territories12 and cities probably 
account for an even larger share of jobs and output.13 We can think of cities as large multi-
institutional, multi-industrial districts. Indeed, urban territories concentrate a considerable number 
of workers and consumers, as well as firms, civic organisations, public agencies, infrastructure and 
collective facilities affiliated with many different activity sectors. Not surprisingly, cities are great 
places to create and innovate due to the intense social interactions available (high endowments of 
CrC and CC). Trading and shopping opportunities also abound because transport costs for both buy-
ers and suppliers are smaller than in rural areas. Higher density rates typical of urban areas facilitate 
infrastructure provision due to smaller fixed costs per capita. However, cities also house considerable 
problems. Pollution, crime, congestion, poverty are, for sure, more serious there than elsewhere. 
Cities matter for their economic development as well as for the prosperity of rural areas which they 
influence. The links between the two may be friendly or unfriendly for their mutual development as 
core-periphery models predict.14 
A comprehensive policy approach to regional development cannot dispense a look at urban tools. A 
first consideration goes to individual urban agglomerations. As in many European countries, Portu-
guese cities need systemic and integrated regeneration operations, particularly at historic centres 
and brownfields. These operations involve public space interventions but also the renewal of private 
property, including land use changes. The isolated investment of a private landlord on a degraded 
neighbourhood will be much less profitable for him than if his action is undertaken simultaneously 
with tens or even hundreds of investment actions by other owners and the local authorities. Isolated, 
individual actions naturally will also tend to be suboptimal from a social viewpoint because of the 
considerable externalities involved. Hence, partnership agreements among relevant private and pub-
lic agents and along the collective efficiency rationale can prove very useful to internalise those spill-
overs and promote cost-efficient urban regenerations, rendering cities much better places to live and 
work in. A second consideration involves networks of cities and their hinterlands. It makes sense to 
put collective efficiency at work in the case of a few urban agglomerations that share a comparative 
advantage in a particular sector. Take the case of aeronautic industry. One city may offer a good 
higher education programme on the field, another may house a couple of plane components manu-
facturing plants, a third one a flight school. Conditioned on serious strategic planning and commit-
ment of relevant players, it may make sense to develop a collective strategy to compete at a higher 
level combining judiciously rivalry with cooperation within the partnership of key players from the 
set of cities. 
                                                            
12 See urban development indicators in World Bank (2011). 
13 As a matter of example, a single metropolitan area in OECD countries may house up to 50% of national GDP. 
The metropolitan areas of “Budapest, Seoul, Copenhagen, Dublin, Helsinki, Randstad-Holland and Brussels 
concentrate nearly half of their national GDP whilst Oslo, Auckland, Prague, London, Stockholm, Tokyo, and 
Paris account for around one third.”—OECD (2006). 
14 We are thinking of the growth pole school in the fifties of the 20th century—of which François Perroux’s 
works collected in Perroux (1964) were probably the most influential—and the current geographical economics 
models in the line of Fujita et al. (1999). 
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Last but not least, we addressed the economic fragility of low density territories. Many predominant-
ly rural spaces round the world face a serious economic and political problem: a long, vicious circle of 
relative, if not absolute, impoverishing development. Distant from dynamic urban centres, they are 
losing active individuals, ageing their population stock, lacking entrepreneurial initiative, featuring 
thin institutional fabrics, missing consumers, failing to attract direct investment, destroying jobs, 
which reinforces population losses and closes the declining circle. Yet, many of these territories also 
house extremely valuable singular assets largely underutilised, such as breathtaking natural parks, 
impressive humanised landscapes, remarkable historical heritage, astonishing immaterial cultural 
values or highly appraised gourmet terroir products. By working out properly the interactions among 
endogenous and exogenous inputs (recall Figure 3), these assets can serve as the foundation for a 
collective dynamics of mercantile valuation to break that circle in and inflow virtuous elements. 
Again, collective efficiency provides the key to activate those interactions. Bringing together a coher-
ent array of private and public agents to structure a sustainable business and job chain around the 
relatively unique territorial asset is the driving idea behind Collective Efficiency Strategy tools for 
rural economies with that kind of competitive vulnerability. Next sections spell out how. 
6 Collective	Efficiency	Strategies:	a	 regional	development	policy	 in-
struments	family	
In all four cases described in Subsection 5.2, there are competitiveness vulnerabilities, available so-
cial capital and extensive non-internalised external effects. Therefore, one major concern of regional 
development policy in the 2005/2009 period had been to push economic agents for win-win strate-
gies of collective efficiency: victory of the individual player and victory of the partnership of players. 
The government placed itself as a cooperation facilitator and launched calls for the emergence of 
voluntary consortia of development actors. 
6.1 A	bird’s	eye	view	
This policy initiative has a label: Collective Efficiency Strategies (CES). After the throughout theoretical 
digression in Sections 3 and 4 and the empirical motivation of Section 5, we think the name is quite 
informative about the purpose of this regional development policy instrument. A CES is a coherent 
and strategically justified set of material and immaterial initiatives that 
• are integrated in an action programme; 
• head for innovation, qualification or modernisation of a constellation of firms with national, 
regional or local implantation; 
• trigger, in a structured manner, the appearance of economies of agglomeration and deliber-
ate joint actions, including network externalities, among firms on the one side, and firms and 
other players relevant to develop their activity sectors and the territories where they locate, 
on the other. 
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The methodology combines top-down political orientations with bottom-up partnership inputs. The 
authorities set up the rules of the game after a careful planning exercise, including hearing the voice 
of potential field players. Then, it is up to development actors to decide with whom to cooperate, 
what for, which strategy to follow, which actions to undertake, which own resources to use, and how 
to self-govern the partnership. 
The government´s role combined a strong political commitment to design the rules, coaching players 
and encouraging their move towards planning and action, with a soft fiscal intervention. As in most 
countries, there was in Portugal a long practice with public subsidies to structural actions by individ-
ual players (firms, municipalities, research centres, etc.). The fiscal component of the CES Initiative is 
a positive discrimination in favour of collective structural actions. If players succeed in putting to-
gether an economically sound, strategically founded action programme that creates and internalises 
positive spillovers, they are encouraged to move forward with a fiscal carrot: they may get a higher 
grant rate or a higher ceiling cap on their individual projects vis-à-vis an alternative situation where 
similar projects eligible to public funding were put forward on an individualistic basis, totally inde-
pendent of each other. If public finances get more constrained, the fiscal stimulus may acquire a 
more cost-effective format. For example, let the general rule be zero grants for private or municipal 
projects and the discrimination a subsidy only large enough to compensate players for the additional 
cost of bargaining and setting a collective action programme. Another interesting carrot a govern-
ment may wish to add to a CES package is the facilitation of licensing procedures required to imple-
ment action programmes. The idea is to speed-up administrative procedures, while keeping the same 
legal obligations applying to the society at large, so as to help each consortium to meet their planned 
schedule and the ideal project sequencing. 
The kind of competitive vulnerabilities identified by the Portuguese government led the CES Initiative 
in this country to take the family form of four closely related policy instruments: 
a) Competitiveness and Technology Poles (Portuguese acronym; PCT); 
b) Other Clusters (idem: OC); 
c) Urban Regeneration and Development Actions (idem: ARDU); 
d) Programmes for the Economic Enhancement of Endogenous Resources (idem: PROVERE). 
Each family member addresses a particular need for collective efficiency. Together, the whole family 
hopes to make a significant contribution to overcome the four domains of competitiveness vulnera-
bility presented in Subsection 5.2. Of course, applications in other countries may wish to tackle dif-
ferent domains. PCT and OC are mainly concerned with knowledge market and productive interna-
tionalisation, ARDU with urban regeneration and productive internationalisation and PROVERE with 
low density territories and internationalisation, especially in terms of visitation, whenever applicable. 
The following subsections will explain a little bit what each member is about.15 
                                                            
15 They are based on the CES legal framework definitions, NSRF (2208). 
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6.2 Competitiveness	and	Technology	Poles	(PCT)	
PCT are an instrument to seduce innovative network setting in technology-intensive sectors with a 
strong orientation towards global markets. 
Each pole is a partnership comprising firms and support institutions, notably R&TD, higher education 
and professional training units. Partners share a strategic view based on innovative activities or head-
ing for innovative outputs, with significant knowledge contents, and are clearly committed with an 
international market orientation. A compulsory feature of the partnership must be its complemen-
tary structure. Contributions by one member are expected to stimulate contributions by others 
around a core of corporate activities with national implantation, high technological intensity and 
sound demand perspectives. 
The pole should have or should create the required critical mass to achieve its global projection. The 
pole’s innovative environment should induce members’ insertion in worldwide knowledge networks 
or business-based chain values and the attraction of structuring direct foreign investment and top-
quality human talent to Portuguese territories. 
The strategy, the self-governance model, and the projects described in the action programme must 
be coherent with public policies goals and instruments. Moreover, they should aim to brand interna-
tionally the technological capacity of Portugal and able to work as territorial marketing elements. 
As explained in the following section, the rules of the game comprise a competitive process to select 
which applications will be awarded the recognition as PCT type of CES and the corresponding set of 
duties and rights. To exemplify, in Portugal there are recognised PCT in the following sectors: health, 
fashion, energy, mobility industries and information & communication technologies. 
6.3 Other	Clusters	(OC)	
Firms and regional support institutions, sharing a strategic vision for the development of a particular 
economic activity sector in a given territory, getting together to implement a common action pro-
gramme, can be recognised as an “Other Cluster” (OC) type of CES. Contrary to the PCT type, an OC 
must comprise a close tie between territory and sector and does not need to focus extensively on 
R&TD activities. The geographical coverage of the partnership is not necessarily national; indeed it is 
expected to be narrower. Here, the focus is on the traditional industrial district concept where physi-
cal presence and business chain value of closely-related activity sectors are the driving agglomerative 
forces to explore. 
To be considered for public encouragement, members must show their willingness to embark on 
technological, commercial or organisational changing processes able to boost the sector’s or the 
territory’s competitiveness. Their strategy, governance model and projects must be focused on spe-
cific areas, critical to set a sustainable cluster, a cluster effective at running joint actions and deliver-
ing positive externalities with significant territorial and sectoral impact. The size and internal diversity 
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of the cluster must be large enough to enable the development of durable innovative projects on a 
regular basis. It should also set the right conditions to orient firms towards international markets. 
As examples, consider some of the winner applications in the 2009 Portuguese contest: wine cluster 
of the demarcated Douro region, North region creative industries cluster, natural stone cluster and 
the sustainable habitat cluster. 
6.4 Urban	Regeneration	and	Development	Actions	(ARDU)	
The government may recognise as an ARDU type of CES a local-based integrated urban development 
plan with business projects whose aims are either: 
• Requalification or renewal of trade and service activities located in areas covered by an inte-
grated urban rehabilitation or revitalization programme; 
• Creation of new innovative and creative economic activities; 
• Or Relocation of economic activities to socially more convenient business hosting areas. 
An ARDU partnership must involve firms and municipalities (as compulsory members) and possibly 
business associations and other agents relevant for urban development. The partnership has to be 
part of an underlying integrated urban development programme led by the municipality (or collec-
tion of municipalities) fitting within the country’s urban policy framework. In the Portuguese case, 
such programme needs to be approved as a local application of the Urban Regeneration Partnerships 
instrument or as multi-city implementation of the Urban Networks for Competitiveness and Innova-
tion instrument. In both cases, the idea is to bring together, in a coordinated way, public and private 
interventions with the aim of reinforcing the economic attractiveness of cities as places to work and 
reside. 
6.5 Programmes	for	the	Economic	Enhancement	of	Endogenous	Resources	
(PROVERE)	
The PROVERE type of CES addresses economic geographies featuring low population densities with 
structural relative impoverishment circles as described at the end of Subsection 5.2. In the Portu-
guese case, to illustrate, 61% of the mainland territory has less than 46 inhabitants per km2 and 
house 1 million individuals, i.e., 10.8% only of total population. The (unweighted) per capita purchas-
ing power mean in municipalities comprised in that definition amounts to just 64% of the national 
average (2008 data).16 
In general, such territories do not house enough entrepreneurial and support units to qualify as a 
cluster. There may be firms from different economic sectors but with too many holes in the business 
value chains. Very often, the entrepreneurial spirit is weak and the institutional fabric too thin. Yet, 
                                                            
16 These figures and a complete exposition about the PROVERE Initiative in Portugal can be found at Baleiras 
(2011c). 
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many territories have one or two distinguishing endogenous asset, hardly replicable in the long run, 
economically appraised by visitors or non-resident consumers. Take the case, for example, of an out-
standing natural park, a breathtaking humanised landscape, a constellation of remarkable castles and 
palaces, a collection of traditional expertise so often linked to gourmet agro-industrial, handicraft 
and other terroir products. These tangible or intangible assets portray unique features that prevent 
their imitation elsewhere in the foreseeable future. Many people in rural and urban areas derive 
utility out of these resources and are willing to pay for them, either by making visitations to and 
promenades through such places or buying remotely goods and services produced out of those spe-
cial resources. If that is so, it makes sense to work out a collective strategy to extract economic value 
from these endogenous resources mainly to the benefit of residents in their vicinities. It may pay off 
to congregate the interests of tens of firms and non-profitable organisations (social and public sec-
tors) around an action programme anchored on one or two endogenous resources and headed for 
business delivery and the attraction of visitors and additional enterprises. The call to collective effi-
ciency makes sense here. Ceteris paribus, both the private and the social productivity of an euro of 
investment is higher when such decision is coordinated with many other players’ actions than when 
that euro is just a one-agent’s isolated investment. 
An example helps to clarify the PROVERE typology. From 1850’s to 1960, Portugal’s most impressive 
mining adventure took place at Mina de São Domingos (Mértola “concelho”), nearly 80 km north of 
the Algarve coast line and 20 kms east of the Spanish border. Ruins and (contained) acid water la-
goons spread over many hectares. Beja’s new international airport and the rising touristic resort des-
tination along the Alqueva lake lie at 1h and 1h30m distance, respectively. Suppose a firm sets there 
a thematic leisure park devoted to the mining memory. Another firm opens a touristic river cruise 
route between the cosmopolitan Algarve harbours and Pomarão dock (at the edge of Mina de São 
Domingos’ territory). The thematic park benefits the cruise firm by offering a new touristic product 
that enriches the navigation experience and cruise boats favour the thematic park with regular cus-
tomer inflows. The same could be said about the complementarities with Alqueva resorts. Mértola 
municipality could also help to leverage this partnership by building and operating a blue flag river 
beach close to a charm hotel ran by another company. A regional development agency mobilises tens 
of traditional pork and handicraft products to enter into touristic package agreements, combining 
also bird watching and radical sports activities operated by micro and small companies. Manor hous-
es, nature and rural tourism lodging units along the 80 km Portuguese and Spanish banks of the Gua-
diana River will find a way to enter into those packages as well. This example illustrates how a coor-
dinated array of private and public actions around a singular endogenous asset (the onsite mining 
memories) may be worked out to reverse the declining path of an aged low density area. An amateur 
video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdbrsfBLEyE and a Wikipedia page at 
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http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mina_de_S%C3%A3o_Domingos give you a flavour of what could be 
done to turn the example into reality.17 
So a PROVERE CES application is a partnership of regional or local base institutions, such as firms 
(compulsory requirement), business associations, local governments, higher education units, regional 
development agencies and local development associations (Leader organisations).18 Its focus is on 
the unique endogenous asset rather than in a particular economic activity sector. Based on the col-
lective efficiency rationale, members must set a strategy, a self-governance model and individual and 
joint activities aiming at enhancing the competitiveness of the target low-density territory around 
the singular endogenous asset(s). By mobilising adequately endogenous capital endowments, the 
implementation of their action programme is expected to reverse the territory’s economic repulsive-
ness, which means valuing cultural and natural heritage, generating new activities, densifying the 
business fabric, among other things, leading ultimately to population retention and renewal. 
Recognised PROVERE CES include endogenous assets as different as the Roman presence heritage at 
Terras de Sicó, the Upper Palaeolithic rock-art of the Côa valley, deactivated 19th century railway 
tracks in Alentejo, shale villages in Beira Interior or thermal water resources in Centro region. 
7 The	operational	outline	
The design and implementation of the CES tools of regional development policy, though not complex, 
hardly fits in the space of one section. Thus, we offer here just a barebone presentation of the opera-
tional details. The interested reader may find a comprehensive explanation in Baleiras (2011c) for the 
PROVERE type of CES. 
7.1 Common	features	
For the sake of simplicity, the four CES types share a number of features: 
• Formal partnership contract between members; 
• Firms are the only playing category whose membership is compulsory (otherwise there 
would be no competitiveness enhancement goal in this policy); 
• Members draft and implement an action programme; 
• A sound development strategy backs up the action programme; 
• There is a self-governance model; 
                                                            
17 Personal note: inspiration for CES policy tools came to the author’s mind when he spent the 2006 Easter 
weekend in this spot. The beach and the hotel were already there but all other clustering activities are fictitious 
for expositional sake (and for how long?). 
18 These associations have an important mobilising role in rural economies and, in the case of the EU, they are 
the pivotal elements of the Leader community programme for rural development. 
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• The action programme has a five-year lifetime but needs to install endogenous capacity so 
that the partnership may last longer on its own to sustain further clustering activities without 
public support; 
• The action programme describes two kinds of structural action or investment: anchor and 
complementary projects; 
• Anchor projects are key activities to deliver the collective strategy. They must have a direct 
and visible contribution to impact indicators. These projects may be individual but a few of 
them must correspond to a joint action, as defined in Subsection 4.3 (e.g., real assets sharing, 
such as infrastructure and other collective use facilities, and common interest technology 
development and transfer projects); 
• Complementary projects are not essential for the strategy success but help to densify the in-
ter-partner transactions and deepen the collective efficiency. They add social value to the 
anchor projects; 
• Anchor and complementary projects receive different privileges upon the official recognition 
of the action programme (to be determined in each country according to available public re-
sources and political preferences); 
• Qualification for government encouragement requires strategic alignment with EU, national 
and regional development planning, as appropriate; 
• Forms of government encouragement include technical coaching, accelerated licensing pro-
cedures and financial incentives; 
• Government encouragement is conditional on a quality screening device and subject to a 
competitive selection procedure (see below). 
7.2 Action	programme	
The formalisation of a CES partnership requires an Action Programme designed by the partners 
themselves. Public encouragement terms granted to any CES application is conditional upon approval 
on a specific competition to recognise individual action programmes as a Collective Efficiency Strate-
gy. Details of the recognition process will be given below. So the action programme is the document 
that introduces a candidate partnership to the authorities in charge of the policy tool and, at the 
same time, engages all partners publicly with its implementation. Each document must include, at 
least, the following chapters: 
a) Diagnosis; 
b) Strategy and territorial, sectoral or technological focus; 
c) Scope and ends; 
d) Identification of endogenous capital endowments to mobilise; 
e) Governance model and leadership; 
f) Action and project files (description of anchor and complementary projects); 
g) Indicative demand for licensing requirements and public grant. 
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7.3 Public	funding	
There are two issues that need to be solved from the outset: how does the policy access to taxpay-
ers’ money? How is that money passed to partners? In many countries, regional development policy 
has a pocket of its own assigned by the general government budget and the former question is not 
relevant. The member of government in charge of that policy can decide how much to allocate from 
that pocket to the CES initiative. Yet, that is not always the case. For instance, in Portugal a Prime-
Minister’s decision ruled out the possibility of a dedicated financial endowment for the CES tools; 
money to pass to players would have to be raised on a competitive basis within the general frame-
work of the country’s National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF).19 The latter issue above con-
cerns the selectivity degree the government wants to impose on the CES initiative. We recommend a 
competitive allocation mechanism to both private and public partnership members, based on ex-ante 
and interim quality assessments. This mechanism should provide the right incentives for top quality 
action programmes to emerge and to keep members’ commitment with targets delivery. 
A third financial issue is the public incentive form. The concern here should be to compensate part-
ners for the additional costs coordinated actions impose on individual members so as to make coop-
eration part of their best interests. The appropriate form varies with existing rules (industrial policy, 
intergovernmental transfers, etc.) for subsidising analogous uncoordinated individual projects and, 
therefore, each country must find the best solution to their case. In some cases, a few percentage 
points more in the subsidy rate may suffice, a dedicated grant ceiling in general calls for CES and non-
CES investment projects may seem necessary in others, consideration of exclusive eligible expendi-
tures may make sense in particular circumstances, specific financial engineering tools may yet be 
another possibility... Probably a mix of these and other suggestions should be considered. 
In the Portuguese case, public grants come from the NSRF on a competitive basis and according to 
the general rules governing structural funds application within national borders. As there was no own 
budget for this policy, it was necessary to design a rather sophisticated institutional system that 
would combine a close articulation of NSRF operational structures and the development of specific 
merit assessment procedures. These procedures were necessary because NSRF rules are meant for 
individual and mono-type projects. On the contrary, CES applications proceed from collective appli-
cations and each application consists of multiple projects, involving very different types of invest-
ment and other structural actions (ranging from professional training to laboratorial experimenta-
tion, to market research, to patent registration, to congress arena construction, to the opening of 
nature walk tracks, etc.). So, it was necessary to devise a screening mechanism acceptable by NSRF 
authorities, a mechanism that would secure the integrity of the common strategy to be implemented 
                                                            
19 Every EU Member State has an NSRF to frame the application of cohesion policy grants within national bor-
ders from 2007 to 2015 (programming lasts to 2013 only). 
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by the agents’ consortium without exempting the merit evaluation of every single project according 
to the relevant NSRF operational programme.20  
7.4 Access	to	public	encouragement	
If a country wishing to adopt CES tools is considering the implementation of either administrative 
inducements, financial incentives or both, it needs a screening device to decide the allocation of pub-
lic support. Who deserves to get such encouragement? Again, the solution to this issue depends a lot 
on the quality requirements of the CES programme and the prevailing initial conditions, thus render-
ing impossible the drafting of a one-size-fits-all screening device. We just sketch the Portuguese ap-
proach for inspirational purposes. 
As a response to the need of integrating the collective efficiency rationale in the competitive public 
funding allocation to structural projects, the ministries of regional development and economy 
worked out a common framework to boost high quality action programme proposals and to select 
the best of them. The framework became known as the “official recognition of the action programme 
as a Type X21Collective Efficiency Strategy”. This selection procedure would take place before actual 
project applications would be submitted to NSRF managing authorities. 
The idea was to define a sound accreditation mechanism to assure credibility to and respect for the 
structural interventions a recognised partnership intends to run. Indeed, a competition to select the 
best action programmes was organised in 2008. There were selection criteria regarding the action 
programme quality as well as its impacts on the economic sector and the relevant territory. The win-
ning applications received on July 2009 a governmental recognition as a Collective Efficiency Strategy 
in the form of an inter-ministerial order.22 This screening device was, therefore, structured to ap-
praise the absolute and relative merit of each action programme application. It was devised as a 
quality stamp to be given to selected action programmes. Thus, it also imposed specific obligations to 
partners and public services, such as implementation time line, interim assessments, appointment of 
public agencies responsible for boosting, monitoring and assessing each CES, and preferential access 
rules to financial incentives. 
So, after the recognition was given, awarded partnerships could set up their organisation and pre-
pare their project applications to operational programmes. Each application contains a label identify-
ing it as a CES project. This label confers the project the rights described in the governmental order 
provided that it complies with the absolute merit and other requirements determined by managing 
authorities. In the Portuguese case, there were no political conditions so far to include administrative 
                                                            
20 Again, for further details of this compatibility exercise (in the case of the PROVERE type of CES), see Baleiras 
(2011c, Subsections 4.2 and 4.4 through 4.7). 
21 With X being PCT, OC or PROVERE. The ARDU type followed a different screening device. 
22 Proposed by the minister in charge of regional development and agreed by the ministers chairing the political 
coordination commission of each NSRF operational programme. 
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facilitation in the public encouragement package. Further details of the recognition process can be 
found in NSRF (2008). 
8 Alignment	with	post-2013	European	political	guidelines	
Europe is preparing the next cycle of community and national policies. It is expected to start in 2014. 
A number of major political orientations have already been decided at the highest level. It is interest-
ing to note how the CES tools in Portugal have started to implement some of those future guidelines 
well before they were discussed. This may be useful to regard them as an inspiration for future policy 
choices both in Portugal and abroad. We will address here three policy documents: Europe’s eco-
nomic development strategy from 2010 to 2020, the so-called Europe 2020 strategy—European 
Commission (2010a); the EU Budget Review—European Commission (2010b); and the conclusions to 
the fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion—European Commission (2010c). 
To begin with, CES find comfort in the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy. CES help Europe to 
deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and development on the ground: smart as CES either 
bring together knowledge providers and business innovators or induce innovative territorial speciali-
sation which generates economic value from relatively idle endogenous assets; sustainable because 
CES are competitiveness oriented, the marketability of PROVERE’s collective efficiency activities is 
based on the durability of natural, heritage and man-made resources and the selection criteria of all 
four CES typologies can induce a greener resource use; inclusive inasmuch as partnerships mobilise 
endogenous factors and, particularly in the case of ARDU and PROVERE varieties, the business and 
job creation focus will help to renew population and bring people back to the labour market in social-
ly fragile territories. 
Secondly, the EU Budget Review. Pp. 11 and 13 in European Commission (2010b) recommend 
stronger, more effective policy coordination among the major community funds for structural actions 
and encourage Member States to use the Common Strategic Framework to bring more rationality to 
their use. We could not agree more with this viewpoint as regional development commands inte-
grated policy approaches. Yet, we know by own experience the political difficulties the Council and 
(national) central governments have had so far to coordinate effectively those funds. Being widely 
open in terms of expenditure eligibility, CES tools call on authorities to make current (EU structural) 
fund rules more flexible, notably in terms of geographic eligibility boundaries and multiple fund ar-
rangements. They also press cohesion, rural development and employment policies to find articulat-
ed solutions indispensable to promote integrated development plans. Thus, CES are a practical ex-
ample of the need for effective cross-policy coordination. 
Finally, the fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion. We know that the conclusions in 
this document follow a three-year long strategic debate with Member States and other relevant 
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stakeholders which seem to endorse those advices.23 We believe CES contribute actively to the deliv-
ery of the outlined recommendations for the future cohesion policy. In particular, we find comfort in 
the following ideas of European Commission (2010c): 
• Increased thematic concentration (heading 2.2); 
• Strengthening performance through conditionality and incentives (heading 2.3); 
• Strengthening governance (heading 3); 
Let us focus attention on heading 3 to see how CES may help to implement its recommendations. 
First, the territorial cohesion dimension (heading 3.1) added by the Lisbon Treaty to the EU ultimate 
goals. On pp. xxviii and xxix, the conclusions urge Member States to address the (new) territorial 
cohesion objective “with particular emphasis on the role of cities (and) areas facing specific geo-
graphical or demographic problems”. ARDU, in the case of cities, and PROVERE, in the case of low 
population density areas, are two actual devices to foster territorial cohesion along those lines. CES 
also address the recommended need for “greater flexibility in organising operational programmes in 
order to reflect the nature and geography of development processes better” by offering a feasible 
solution that reconciles functional territories with the administrative geographies upon which the 
NSRF operational programmes are organised. In fact, a few CES implementations in Portugal combine 
agents and actions located in regions covered by different operational programmes. Second, CES also 
help to implement the partnership reinforcement (heading 3.2) recommendation. Pp. xxix and xxx call 
for the full mobilisation of local and regional stakeholders and suggests the reinforced use of “local 
development approaches (...) by supporting active inclusion, fostering social innovation, developing 
innovation strategies or designing schemes for regeneration of deprived areas”. Moreover, p. xxi 
urge policy-makers to involve regional and local communities in policy design and implementation,24 
which is precisely what CES do. The CES methodology, anchored on self-governed partnerships ema-
nating from below and heading for innovative competitive processes, is quite appropriate to stimu-
late those development approaches. Third, there is a recommendation to reduce reliance on non-
reimbursable financial grants and to move “towards a more balanced mix, including financial engi-
neering (...) as well as more indirect measures, such as advice and guidance and support for network-
ing and clustering (...)”—pp. xx and xxi. As noted above, technical coaching to prepare and manage 
partnerships and administrative (licensing) inducements to implement investment projects are in-
trinsic parts of the public encouragement package of CES tools. 
For all these reasons, we hope readers may find useful inspiration in the CES toolbox to adopt effec-
tive development policies in line with Europe’s objectives on the road to the year 2020. 
                                                            
23 The Portuguese presidency of the EU, together with the European Commission, launched in the second se-
mester of 2007 the political debate on the post-2013 cohesion policy. 
24 European Commission (2010c, p. xxi): “Evaluation evidence has demonstrated that the active participation of 
people and organisations in projects at regional and local level, from the design to the implementation stage, is 
a crucial success factor. Indeed, such partnership is one of the key sources of added-value of Cohesion Policy, 
mobilising the skills and knowledge of those concerned to make programmes more effective and inclusive”. 
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9 Concluding	remarks	
This paper has exposed readers to CES, an innovative family of policy instruments devoted to com-
petitiveness, business boosting and job creation within the modern view of economic development 
policy. As such, many specific endogenous elements are worked out via a dynamic network of top-
down and bottom-up inputs. Cooperation is the cornerstone of each of the four types of CES. The 
collective efficiency concept underlies the doctrinal background of this public policy. 
A number of specific experiments are already on the ground and the first interim independent as-
sessments are expected to become available in early 2012. The author’s political responsibilities until 
October 2009 for the design and launching of CES allows him to recognise their breakthrough contri-
bution for a nationwide endogenous regional development approach. Yet, he is very much aware of 
the difficulties and threats that still pave the way. He believes the difficulties these policy tools still 
face in Portugal may also operate in many other countries where cooperation and integrated cross-
cutting policy approaches are not business as usual. Hence, the following paragraphs, with an explicit 
political assessment, may also provide useful alerts for possible CES adaptations elsewhere. 
Actual Portuguese politics, still populated with so many players (from ministers to mayors to business 
association leaders) addicted on redistributive and top-down orientations, presented always a re-
sistance wall to policy instruments, such as CES, that based their rationale on cooperative and strate-
gy-founded initiatives. It is certainly easier and faster to keep doing investment projects the old way, 
based on infrastructure, individual initiative, non-competitive grants and wealth distribution goals. 
The current economic crisis eases the arguments in favour of spending EU structural funds no matter 
where and no matter what the opportunity cost is. In this environment, it is not hard to issue sound 
bytes claiming that collective efficiency projects are cumbersome and boring.25 However, both eco-
nomic theory and the actual experience of many countries, as Portugal’s in recent years, bring to our 
mind that a sustainable development path should not dispense a view of the future where wealth 
fostering everywhere is a precondition to improve resource distribution. Particularly in the case of 
small open economies, deliberate cooperation or collective efficiency among agents seems a very 
promising route to approach that view. CES tools were devised to help firms, research centres, mu-
nicipalities, public administration units, regional development agencies, local action groups, etc. to 
embark on horizontal and vertical cooperation arrangements to generate value out of knowledge 
and other endogenous territorial assets, thus serving the long term cause of economic development. 
As with many other innovative instruments that challenge the status quo, independent and compe-
tent technical evaluation is indispensable to guide future political decisions, to improve what has 
                                                            
25 Some people say in the media that Portugal needs to spend NSRF money urgently, acting as if financial dis-
bursement were the sole criterion to assess the quality of structural funds use. It seems in their arguing that 
burning 1 million euros digging a hole to simply covering it up subsequently is better than not spending the 
money. They ignore the opportunity cost of such spending. To begin with, on average 50% of Portuguese tax-
payers’ money is included in any structural fund intervention. Moreover, money spent on holes gets buried 
forever and is money that will not be used to improve the economy’s capacity to grow (supply side). 
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been achieved so far, and we hope this job will be done in Portugal with the CES tools. This is im-
portant because a tool that demands so much from the policy addressees needs time to produce 
results; a critical mass of policy persistence, topped with affection from both politicians and officials 
in charge, are two necessary conditions for new, complex instruments to mature and deliver their 
results. This is very much important because CES effectiveness relies on trust, trust between partners 
to undertake structural changes but also trust of partners in the time consistency of government 
options. The tragedy of many countries has a lot to do with the temptation of new government 
members, even from the same political family, to reinvent the wheel and replace short-lived instru-
ments with new ones bearing their fingerprint. Adapting what John Lennon once wrote, “all we are 
saying (to responsible policy-makers) is give CES a chance”.26 
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